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ABSTRACT. In this paper we present the initial design of Minerva consensus protocol for Truechain and other
technical details. Currently, it is widely believed in the blockchain community that a public chain cannot simul-
taneously achieve high performance, decentralization and security. This is true in the case of a Nakamoto chain
(low performance) or a delegated proof of stake chain (partially centralized), which are the most popular block
chain solutions at time of writing. Our consensus design enjoys the same consistency, liveness, transaction
finality and security guarantee, a de-facto with the Hybrid Consensus. We go on to propose the idea of a new
virtual machine on top of Ethereum which adds permissioned-chain based transaction processing capabilities
in a permissionless setting. We also use the idea of data sharding and speculative transactions, and evaluation
of smart contracts in a sharding friendly virtual machine. Finally, we will briefly discuss our fundamentally
ASIC resistant mining algorithm, Truehash.
1. INTRODUCTION
With the surging popularity of cryptocurren-
cies, blockchain technology has caught attention
from both industry and academia. One can think
blockchain as a shared computing environment in-
volving peers to join and quit freely, with the premis
for a commonly agreed consensus protocol. The
decentralized nature of blockchain, together with
transaction transparency, autonomy, immutability,
are critical to crypocurrencies, drawing the baseline
for such systems.
However top earlier-designed cryptocurrencies,
such as Bitcoin[23] and Ethereum[11], have been
widely recognised unscalable in terms of transac-
tion rate and are not economically viable as they re-
quire severe energy consumptions and computation
power. Other contenders such as EOS, whose con-
sensus is based on delegated proof of stake (DPoS),
achieves significantly higher transactions per sec-
ond (tps) by making sacrifices in decentralization.
With the demand of apps and platforms using
public blockchain growing in real world, a secure
protocol that enables higher transaction rates, sacri-
ficing the least possible decentralization is a main
focus the new system. For example, consider a
generic public chain that could host computation-
ally intensive peer to peer gaming applications with
a very large user base. In such a chain, if it also
hosts smart contracts to digital advertisement ap-
plications, online education courses, decentalized
exchange, we could easily expect a huge delay in
transaction confirmation times.
There are other models like delegated mech-
anism of Proof of Stake and Practical Byzan-
tine Fault Tolerant (PBFT) protocols[13]. The
PBFT protocol ensures safety as long as only
one third of the actors in the system are inten-
tionally/unintentionally malacious adversaries, at a
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time[19]. The Byzantine assumption is easily sat-
isfied in a permissioned environment; in a permis-
sionless environment however, it is generally diffi-
cult to guarantee. DPoS’s attempt to mitigate this
problem is, effectively, by adding a barrier to entry
for the Byzantine committee, and a costly punish-
ment for those who commit fraud. Namely, stake-
holders using a token-weighted vote system to form
the Byzantine committee (typically less than 30
nodes). However, decentralization is lost here be-
cause we can expect the same nodes being voted in
each round, by the biggest cartel of token holders in
the network.
In this Paper, we propose Minerva, a Hybrid
Protocol[26] which incorporates a modified form
of PBFT (Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance)[13]
and PoW (Proof of Work) consensus. The PoW
consensus ensures incentivization, committee se-
lection and committee auditing, while the PBFT
layer acts as a highly performant consensus with
capabilities like instant finality with high through-
put, transaction validation, rotating committee for
fair trade economy and a compensation infrastruc-
ture to deal with non-uniform infrastructure. The
nature of hybrid protocol allows it to tolerate cor-
ruptions at a maximum of about one third of peer
nodes.
2. BACKGROUND
2.1. Related Works. The core strength of this pro-
posal lies in the recognition of the theorems pro-
posed in the hybrid consensus protocol[26] by Pass
and Shi. We benefit from the fact that there is a
lot of design space for further optimizations in that
paper. The use of DailyBFT as committee members
allows for the rotating committee feature which pro-
vides for better fairness for the consensus validating
peers.
Hybrid consensus follows a design paradigm
where PBFT and PoW are combined together so
that it enjoys best of both worlds. In general, hybrid
consensus will utilize PBFT protocols, which by de-
fault works in a permissioned setting where all the
identities are known a priori, as a fast path dealing
with large amount of incoming transactions. While
PoW protocols choose the BFT committee based
on a node’s performance in PoW. This provides the
barebone necessary to deal with dynamic member-
ship and committee switching in the permissionless
setting.
2.2. Assumptions. The Minerva protocol is de-
signed to operate in an permissionless environment,
where each node agree to update their LOG via a
common consensus. Taking network delays into
consideration, that view from each node may look
different from others. Hence, the network in gen-
eral will be at an asynchronous state, consistency
only happens before the last λ blocks, where λ is a
natural number.
Let LOG(t, i) denote the view of LOG from node
i at time t . The following security requirements
must be guaranteed with overwhelming probability.
• Consistency: If i is an honest node, there
exists λ > 0 independent of t , such that
LOG(t − λ, i) is constant with respect to i .
We denote this value by LOG(t).
• Liveness: Let TXs(t, j) be transactions pre-
sented to an honest node j at time t . There
exist τ > 0, independent of t , such that
TXs(t, i) ⊆ LOG(t + τ , i) for all honest
nodes i .
To ensure the above security requirement is met,
the following parameters will play an important role
in managing chain security.
• Chain quality Qfast: Proportion of honest
nodes in a Byzantine committee. In the case
of a PoW chain, Qsnail represent the propor-
tion of last λ blocks mined by honest nodes.
In a permissioned Byzantine network, it is of-
ten safe to assume that chain quality to stay above
2/3 + ǫ. To satisfy the security requirements in a
permissionless setting, we must invent new proto-
cols to manage chain quality in such a way that it
stays above 2/3+ ǫ with overwhelming probability.
2.3. Adversary Model. Our adversary model fol-
lows the assumptions in [26] where adversaries
are allowed to mildly adaptively corrupt any node,
while corruptions do not take effect immediately.
In section 4 of the Yellow Paper, we will formally
explain our adversary model, and talk about modifi-
cations in Universal Composabililty model [12] and
[15].
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3. BLOCKCHAIN, BLOCKS, STATE AND
TRANSACTIONS
We now introduce the structure of our
blockchain, and their underlying details.
3.1. The Blockchain. Our blockchain design is
largely based on Hybrid Consensus by Pass and
Shi [26], with several modifications and improve-
ments in order to tailor for the application scenarios
that we focus on. In this subsection we will present
an overview of the Minerva protocol, while focus-
ing mainly on the development of the blockchain.
Details on the consensus itself is left to the next sec-
tion.
Under the protocol proposed by [26], the hy-
brid blockchain is a union of two blockchains. A
snailchain and a fastchain, whose entire ledger
history is denoted by LOG and log respectively.
The fastchain can be thought of as the union of
DailyBFT chains, where each DailyBFT chain the
log output of the Byzantine committee during its
term of service.
Nodes in the fastchain act as Byzantine com-
mittee members, they reach consensus via PBFT
voting[13]. Transactions and smart contracts are ex-
ecuted on the fastchain to achieve high throughput.
Members of the Byzantine committee randomly ro-
tate once every fixed period of time T , and the new
committee is selected from PoW miners in a meri-
tocratic fashion. This will enhance decentralization,
as anyone with a computer can join and become a
PoW node. Observe that in the limiting case, where
we take committee rotating frequency to one snail
block and committee size equal to 1, we will re-
cover the traditional PoW consensus.
For the remainder of this subsection, we will talk
about each component of the blockchain in detail.
3.2. Fastchain. A permissioned BFT committee
in the classical setting of [13] is a set of nodes, ca-
pable of communicating with each other, vote to
agree or disagree to a proposal proposed by the
leader. We make no assumptions that these nodes
trust one another, in fact, a subset of these nodes
may be corrupted adversaries. Through deep anal-
ysis of the Byzantine generals problem in [19], the
authors have concluded that a consensus is always
reachable when 2
3
+ ǫ of the nodes are honest.
Under this assumption, a transaction is processed
on the fastchain as follows.
• The leader propose a set of transactions
TXs that she think are valid. That is, the
digital signature of the sender, and if any il-
legal states are created as a result of execut-
ing TXs. She then sign off with her digital
signature, and broadcast to other committee
members.
• Upon receiving the proposal, committee
members checks for validity of TXs. Sign
off and broadcast if they think it’s valid.
• Upon hearing 2
3
+ ǫ affirmative votes, com-
mittee member nodes update TXs to their
fastchain log.
• TXs has now been included a fast block,
meaning a block on the fastchain. The
block will be broadcasted to PoW nodes as
a message m, that contain a digest and a
serial number.
Changes to the protocol is necessary as it is dif-
ficult to guarantee 2
3
+ ǫ of the committee members
are necessarily honest in a permissionless setting.
Instead, we need to invent new protocol to ensure
Qfast stays above
2
3
+ ǫ under the adversary model
described in section 4.2. We will talk in depth about
chain quality management.
3.3. Snailchain. The greatest challenge that PoW
based consensus faces today are efficiency and scal-
ability. Slow execution and confirmation time make
it unfit to develop complex applications, and exces-
sive energy consumption make it environmentally
unfriendly. Unlike Ethereum, where transactions
and smart contracts are executed by every node on
the network; a rotating BFT committee will handle
the bulk of heavy lifting while PoW (the snailchain)
will only be used to select the committee members,
through a meritocratic process in proof of work. We
briefly describe the procedure in this subsection.
The snailchain we first consider is the blockchain
structure used in BTC and ETH, we call this the
Nakamoto chain. Here, blocks are of the form
B = (h−1, blockdata, h), where blockdata are the
transactions and digital signatures that’s recorded
Truechain: Highly Performant Decentralized Public Ledger Version 1.02
in that block; h is the hash value produced from
mining and h−1 is the hash value of the previous
block. Through the continuous links of hash data,
the blocks form as a chain structure known as the
blockchain.
If the Nakamoto chain is used as the snailchain,
blockdata can essentially be reduced to a digest of
all the transactions that happened in the fastchain
that during the snail block. The motivation is
that, while the data contents in the fastchain is
publically accessible to everyone, it would be ex-
tremely wasteful to store thousands or millions
copies across the PoW nodes. PoW nodes only
have to store enough data to ensure the validity of
fastchain transactions, and not the transaction data
themselves. Only nodes that wish to participate in
PBFT, will need to synchronize to the fastchain.
The Nakamoto chain have several drawbacks.
The most important of which is the practice of self-
ish mining, will require the minimal snail chain
quality Qsnail >
3
4
to ensure Qfast >
2
3
[25]. In
a permissionless setting with mildly adaptive ad-
versaries, we want Qfast to decay as slow as pos-
sible. Therefore, we choose fruitchain [25] over
the traditional Nakamoto chain for our underlying
snailchain. Readers are referred to [25] for a detail
analysis of the fruitchain framework. Particularly,
we only require Qsnail >
2
3
to ensure Qfast >
2
3
,
even with the assumption that miners will mine
selfishly when given the opportunity. Here, we
only briefly describe the basic mechanics of how it
works.
A fruitchain consist of blocks and fruits, ar-
ranged in way that blocks relate to eachother like
Nakamoto blockchain, while each block contain
a large number of fruits. Mining difficulty is
set so that each block takes 10 minutes to mine,
while each fruit take 1 second to mine. The asyn-
chronousity nature of the network means that we
can only expect honest nodes to agree on LOG ear-
lier than t − λ at time t , for some λ > 0. There-
fore, nodes will have different views of LOG while
they mine fruits, due to the low difficulty of min-
ing. Hence, we allow fruits to mined out of order,
provided that it hangs[25] from a block not too far
back in the history.
In our application, each fruit is essentially a di-
gest of the corresponding fast block. Fruits bare a
serial number given by the fastchain, this is to allow
block miners to recover the correct order of trans-
action history when dust finally settles. All PoW
nodes must verify validity of the fast block, which
will become part of the block header, before its pos-
sible to perform any mining calculation. Therefore,
transactions on Truechain are validated by all PoW
nodes, while still achieving high throughput.
Specifically, a block B = (hblock
−1 , fruitdata, h)
and a fruit F = (hfruit
−1 , digest, serial, h), where
hblock
−1 is the hash of the previous block, and h
fruit
−1
is the hash of any of the most recent λ blocks. We
pick λ = 17 as the recency parameter of the fruit.
Finally, digest is the hash root of transaction data
from the fastchain block.
Here’s a summary of our snailchain procedure,
• Assume Qfast >
2
3
. After a set of trans-
action is processed, a fast block is created
on average once every second. The Byzan-
tine committee will include transaction di-
gest a serial number and broadcast to the
PoW nodes as a message m.
• PoWminers solve an easier puzzle to pack-
agem in a fruit. Mining difficulty is set so a
fruit is created once every second, matching
the block frequency in the fastchain. Fruits
can be mined out of order, as their parent
hash can be pointed to any of the last λ
blocks of the snailchain.
• The snail chain block is finality of the trans-
action. A block is mined once every 10
minutes, and it contains all the fruits with
contiguous serial numbers mined up to that
period.
3.4. Motivations for fruitchain. A functioning
BFT committee require 2/3 of its members to be
honest[13]. Hence we require the fast chain qual-
ity Qfast > 2/3. A naive implementation using a
Nakamoto chain as the snailchain will be vulnera-
ble to obvious selfish mining attack strategies. If
a selfish miner controlled more than 25% of the
blockchain’s hash power, she could control more
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than 33% of block production[24][16]. The prob-
ability of being elected to the BFT committee, ac-
cording to the procedure described in [26], is equal
to one’s block production fraction. Hence, the self-
ish miner is likely to control over 1/3 of the BFT
committee. If she happens to be adversarial, the
BFT protocol is now compromised.
The worst case scenario is possible through a
strategy illustrated in [29]. If a selfish miner con-
trols 40% of the hash power in a Ethereum-type
blockchain, she can control 70% of block produc-
tion through optimized selfish mining. According
to the committee election procedure in [26], she will
have control over 70% of the BFT committee. The
BFT committee is not only compromised, the self-
ish miner will have the dictatorial dominance to de-
clare any honest committee member as ’dishonest’
at her will.
We choose the fruitchain[25] as our underlying
snailchain for hybrid consensus. The actual growth
process of the fruitchain will be explained in de-
tail in a later subsection. The fruitchain is more re-
sistant to selfish mining, as stated by the fairness
theorem in [25]. The required chain snail chain
quality needed to maintain fast chain security is
Qsnail =
2
3
+ ǫ on a PBFT-Fruitchain hybrid, as
opposed toQsnail =
3
4
+ǫ on a PBFT-Nakamoto hy-
brid. The extra chain quality required by Nakamoto
chain is to counteract against security loss from self
mining practices.
However, the BFT committee is still vulnerable
should an attacker directly control over 33% of the
blockchain’s hash power. Hence, we will take fur-
ther deviations from [26] and [25] to alleviate the
issues.
There are two undesirable extremes that we need
to find a balance in,
• Randomly select BFT members via
VRF[22]. This is vulnerable against a sybil
attack.
• Any selection procedure where probability
of being selected is proportional to hash
power. The BFT committee is vulnerable
against mining pools who are rich in hash
power.
Our proposed solution are as follows. When an
honest BFT node’s chain reaches λ in length, it will
publish the unique miner IDs of every fruit in the
chain as candidates (or, every miner ID who mined
more than ν fruits). The new BFT committee is ran-
domly selected from the candidates with uniform
probability. The obvious sybil attack is not possible
under this scheme, as you require a minimal level of
PoW to become a candidate. Neither it will be easy
for a large mining pool to achieve compromise the
BFT committee. A fruit will be orders of magnitude
easier to mine than a block.
Details on the BFT committee selection will be
included in the next section. We will explain the
interactions of fastchain and fruitchain, how they
process transactions and smart contracts in the next
subsection.
3.5. The Block.
3.5.1. Block structure. There are three types of
blocks that require explanation in Truechain. Fast
block, the fruit and snail block. They interact in
the following manner, the fast block is produced by
PBFT and broadcasted to PoW nodes as a message
m. PoW nodes will first mine m as a fruit, before
packaging fruits into a block.
A fruit is the tuple f = (h−1; h
′; η; digest;m; h),
while a block is the tuple b = ((h−1; h
′; η; digest;m; h),F )
where each entry means
• h−1 points to the previous block’s refer-
ence, only useful for fruit verification.
• h′ points to a block that contains the fruit,
only useful for block verification.
• η is the random nonce.
• digest is a collision resistant hash function,
value used to check the fruit’s validity.
• m is the record contained in the fruit.
• h = H(h−1; h
′; η, d(F );m) is the hash
value of the block / fruit.
• F is a valid fruitset as defined in [25].
The blockchain chain = {chain[0], chain[1], ..., chain[l ]}
is a collection of individual blocks ordered by index
i , where chain[i ].h−1 = chain[i − 1].h, and l is the
length of chain. We call a fruit f λ-’recent’ w.r.t.
chain if f ∈ {chain[l −λ+1].F ∪ ...∪ chain[l ].F}.
In our implementation, we choose λ = 17
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3.5.2. Data in block. There are two types of blocks
in Truechain, fast block and snail block. The hash
algorithm used by Truechain is Sha3, which will be
referred to as hash.
The fast block contain the following:
• ParentHash: Hash value of parents block’s
header.
• StateRoot: Hash root of the state Merkle
tree, after all transactions are executed.
• Transactions root: Hash root of the Merkle
tree with each transaction in the transac-
tions list.
• ReceiptHash: Hash root of the Merkle tree
with receipts of each transaction in the
transactions list.
• Proposer: Address of proposer of the trans-
action
• Bloom: The Bloom filter
• SnailHash: Hash of the snail block mining
is rewarded to
• SnailNumber: Height of the snail block
mining is rewarded to
• Number: Number of ancestor blocks
• GasLimit: Limit of gas expenditure per
block
• GasUsed: Total gas used for this block
• Time: Timestamp
• Extra: Preallocated space for miscellaneous
use
The snail block contain the following:
• Parent hash (h−1): Hash value of parents
block’s header.
• Uncle hash: Hash value of uncle blocks.
• Coinbase: Coinbase address of the miner.
• PointerHash: The block hash which the
fruit is hanging from.
• PointerNumber: The block height which
the fruit is hanging from.
• FruitsHash: Hash data of the included fruits
in a block
• Fasthash: Hash data of the fast block
• FastNumber: Block height of the fastchain.
• SignHash: Hash of the digital signatures of
the PBFT committee
• Bloom: The Bloom filter
• Difficulty: Difficulty used by the block
• FruitDifficulty: Difficulty used by the fruit
• Number: Number of ancestor blocks
• Publickey: EC-Schnorr public key of the
leader who proposed the fast block
• ToElect: Whether PBFT committee mem-
bers will rotate after this block
• Time: Timestamp
• Extra: Preallocated space for miscellaneous
use
• MixDigest: Digest of the fast block
• Nonce: Block nonce
3.6. Fruitchain growth process. Inheriting the
variable definitions from [25] (p.14 - 16), the
fruitchain consist of a blockchain with each block
containing its own set of fruits. Transactions ex-
ecuted by the BFT will be initially packaged as a
record m to be mined as a fruit. Fruits more recent
than a recency parameter R will be packaged into a
block when the next block is mined.
The miner will run only one mining algorithm
that produces hash values h from a random ora-
cle. A fruit is mined when [h]−κ < Dpf , and a
block is mined when [h]κ < Dp, where Dpf and
Dp are the mining difficulty parameter of the fruit
and block respectively. The tuple (R ,Dp,Dpf ) de-
termines mining process.
In order to discourage the deployment of ASICs,
we will make the recency parameter κ = κ(t) time-
dependent. VRF will generate and broadcast a new
κ(t) (to fall within the valid range) using VRF once
every 3 months. Details of this process will be in-
cluded in a future version of the yellow paper.
More specifically, the mining algorithm goes as
follows.
We tentatively choose Dp and Dpf such that ex-
pected time to mine a fruit and block are respec-
tively 1 second and 10 minutes.
We make the following remark with our mining
process,
• Fruits are easier to mine than blocks, and
therefore miners are less incentivized to
join or form mining pools. This make PoW
a fairer process.
• Since fruit mining difficulty is low, its quite
likely that two fruits are mined simultane-
ously. One way of determining which is
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Algorithm 1: Blockchain growth process
1 Initialize
2 chain = chain[0]
3 chain[0] = (0; 0; 0; 0;⊥;H(0; 0; 0; 0;⊥), ∅)
4 F = ∅
5 if heard fruit f ′ then
6 if f ′ is the unique fruit corresponding to message m′ then
7 F = F ∪ f ′
8 if f ′.h−1 < f .h−1 for all other fruits f such that f .m = m
′. then
9 F = F ∪ f ′
10 if heard blockchain chain′ and |chain′.F | > |chain.F | then
11 chain = chain′
12 where |chain.F | is the total number of fruit contained in chain.
13 foreach time step (1 sec) do
14 Heard signed message m, broadcasted by PBFT. Let
15 l = |chain| − 1, so chain = (chain[0], ..., chain[l ]).
16 F ′ = {f ∈ F : f recent w.r.t. chain, f 6∈ chain}
17 h′ = chain[pos].h−1 where pos = max(1, l − κ).
18 h−1 = chain[l − 1].h.
19 while mined = FALSE do
20 Randomly pick η ∈ {0, 1}κ
21 Compute h = H(h−1; h
′; η;d(F ′);m)
22 if [h]−κ: < Dpf then
23 f = (h−1; h
′; η;d(F ′);m, h)
24 F = F ∪ f
25 boardcast fruit f
26 mined = FRUIT
27 if [h]:κ < Dp then
28 chain[l ] = ((h−1; h
′; η;d(F ′);m, h),F ′)
29 broadcast blockchain chain
30 mined = BLOCK
the valid fruit is by choosing the one with
a lower hash value.
• Fruits are not stable until they are written in
a block. Therefore the mining reward will
be paid to the block miner, who will then
distribute her reward to miners of fruits that
are included in the block.
• One advantage of the fruitchain protocol is
that fruits can be mined in any order, and
this can make mining highly parallel. This
will be particularly useful when combined
with sharding.
3.7. The world state and snapshotting. The
world state is a database running in the background,
in the form of a Merkle tree, that provide a mapping
between addresses and account state. Being an im-
mutable data structure, it allows any previous state
to be reconstructed by altering the root hash accord-
ingly.
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The account state consist of the following infor-
mation.
• Nonce: Number of transactions or contract
creations made by this account. The value
of this number is non-decreasing with re-
spect to block height.
• Balance: A non-negative value indicating
the amount of tokens held by the account.
• CodeHash: This stores the hash digest of
the contract code, that will be executed
should this address receive a message call.
This field is strictly immutable and should
not be changed after construction.
• StorageRoot: The root hash of the storage
associated with each account.
3.8. Transactions and execution. The transaction
is a cryptographically signed message initiated by
a client user of Truechain. The message take the
following form:
• AccountNonce: Number of transactions
sent by the sender.
• GasPrice: Number of Wei to be paid per
unit of gas for this transaction.
• GasLimit: Maximum amount of gas should
be used for this transaction.
• Recipient: Address of the beneficiary for
this transaction.
• Payload: Amount of token to be transacted.
• Code: Virtual machine code for smart con-
tract deployment.
• Data: Miscellaneous use.
• V,R,S: Cryptographic values corresponding
to the signature of the transaction, and used
to determine the sender of the transaction.
The transaction will go through the following
steps to reach finality.
(1) The transaction, along with a set of other
transactions, would accumulated in txpool.
(2) The leader of the PBFT committee select a
subset of txpool that she believe is valid,
and make a proposal to other committee
members.
(3) Committee members checks the validity of
all transactions proposed by the leader, and
if they agree, sign and boardcast to other
committee members.
(4) Upon hearing more than 2
3
affirmative
votes, a consensus is formed. The transac-
tion is then broadcasted to PoW nodes as a
message.
(5) PoW miners first validate the transactions
of the block, which becomes a part of the
block header, and package them in a fruit.
Fruits can be mined in arbitrary order.
(6) When the next block is mined, the block
miner will package the biggest contigu-
ous set (as per fruit serial number from
fast block) to the block where finality is
reached.
(7) We resolve a snailchain fork by aligning
to the branch with the highest sum of fruit
difficulty. The probability of two branches
with equal difficulty sum is negligible.
4. CONSENSUS DETAILS
4.1. Adversary model. In the previous section, we
introduced the Minerva consensus model based hy-
brid blockchain architecture. One important point
we glossed over was the security of PBFT in our
fastchain. As stated in section 3.2, the classical
PBFT by the design[13], operate in a permissioned
environment. The Byzantine assumption that less
than 1
3
of the participating nodes are corrupt is
quite conservative. In a permissionless environment
however, this means we need to maintain fastchain
quality Qfast >
2
3
, for the chain to sustain con-
sistency and liveness. In this section, we will talk
in detail about the formation and secure communi-
cation of the PBFT committee, view change, and
protective measures to maintain Qfast above that
threshold.
We assume the following about our operating en-
vironment, which we call our adversary model.
(1) Let Qsnail be the proportion of hash power
controlled by honest mining nodes. We as-
sume that Qsnail >
2
3
, this is slightly more
conservative than the security assumptions
made by leading projects such as Bitcoin
and Ethereum, where effectively they only
assume Qsnail >
1
2
.
(2) We assume our adversaries are mildly adap-
tive. By adaptive, we mean a node can
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to the committee, and suddenly turn adver-
sarial once it is elected. In a mildly adap-
tive model, we do not assume this process
to be instantaneous, but rather occur over a
period of time. This is also the assumption
made in [26].
(3) A node that become corrupt precisely after
τ fastchain time steps of election is called
a τ -agile adversary. We do not make as-
sumptions on the value or distribution that
τ should take.
(4) BFT committee members are elected from
PoW nodes with a meritocratic, albeit per-
missionless, process. We do not assume the
node themselves to possess advanced cyber
security measures, and honest nodes (e.g.
committee member) may turn adversarial
when it is hacked by an external party.
4.2. The DailyBFT protocol.
4.2.1. Daily offchain consensus protocol. In the
fastchain, committee members run an offchain
DailyBFT instance to decide a daily log, whereas
non-members count signatures from committee
members. It extends security to committee non-
members and late-spawning nodes. It carries with
it, a termination agreement which requires that all
honest nodes agree on the same final log upon ter-
mination. InDailyBFT, committee members output
signed daily log hashes, which are then consumed
by the Hybrid Consensus protocol. These signed
daily log hashes satisfy completeness and unforge-
ability.
On keygen, add public key to list of keys. On re-
ceiving a comm signal, a conditional election of the
node as committee member happens. The environ-
ment opens up the committee selectively.
Here is how the subprotocol works for when the
node is a BFT member:- A BFT virtual node is
then forked. BFT virtual node here, denoted by
BFTpk , then starts receiving the TXs (transactions).
The log completion is checked and stopped iff the
stop signal has been signed off by atleast a third of
the initial comm distinct public keys. During this,
a continuous “Until done” check happens and once
completion of gossip happens at each step, all the
stop log entries are removed
Here is how the subprotocol works for when the
node is not a BFTmember:- On receival of a trans-
action, the message is added to history and signed
by a third of the initial comm distinct public keys
The signing algorithm tags each message for the
inner BFT instance with the prefix 0, and each mes-
sage for the outer DailyBFT with the prefix 1 to
avoid namespace collision.
4.2.2. The mempool subprotocol. Initializes TXs
with 0 and keeps a track of incoming transactions
with a Union set. On receiving a propose call, it
adds the transaction to log and communciates with
gossip protocol. It also supports query method to
return confirmed transactions. By keeping track of
transactions in a set, it purges the ones already con-
firmed.
4.2.3. Newly spawned nodes. A newly spawned
node with an implicit message routing that car-
ries with it history of the transcripts sent and re-
ceived. This interacts with the following compo-
nents - Mempools, Snailchain, Preprocess, Daily
Offchain Consensus, and on chain validation.
4.3. Hybrid committee election. In [26], BFT
committee instances are switched after a fixed pe-
riod of time (with the snailchain as a logical clock).
Our snailchain is expected to produce one block ev-
ery 10 minutes, so we’ve set a rotating frequency
of 144 blocks. According to [26], a new committee
is formed simply by the miners of the latest csize
number of blocks inside snailchain.
A naive implementation of [26] will be vulnera-
ble to well known selfish mining attack strategies.
The damage of selfish mining is magnified in the
hybrid consensus setting, because power is more
concentrated in the top few high hash nodes. If
a selfish miner controlled more than 25% of the
blockchain’s hash power, she could control more
than 33% of block production[24][16]. Under the
election procedure described in [26], the selfish
miner is likely to control over 1/3 of the BFT
committee. If she happens to be adversarial, the
fastchain will lose the liveness property.
There are two undesirable extremes that we need
to find a balance in,
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• Randomly select BFT members via
VRF[22]. This is vulnerable against a sybil
attack.
• Any selection procedure where probability
of being selected is proportional to hash
power. The BFT committee is vulnerable
against mining pools who are rich in hash
power.
Our proposed solution are as follows. When an
honest BFT node’s chain reaches λ in length, it will
publish the unique miner IDs of every fruit in the
chain as candidates (or, every miner ID who mined
more than ν fruits). The new BFT committee is ran-
domly selected from the candidates with uniform
probability. The obvious sybil attack is not possible
under this scheme, as you require a minimal level of
PoW to become a candidate. Neither it will be easy
for a large mining pool to achieve compromise the
BFT committee. A fruit will be orders of magnitude
easier to mine than a block.
The uniformly distributed random number we
use is similar to VRF [22] where the seed is de-
termined by the seed used in previous committee
selection, as well as the proposed randomness from
recent csize blocks. Different from Algorand [17],
here we don’t count stake weights for this part of
selection. Notice that the nodes that are chosen by
random functions would have certain probability of
not being online. This will cause our fastchain to
lose chain quality. The user will need to manually
flag that they are willing to participate in the com-
mittee election.
4.4. Secure communication channel. The ability
to establish a secure communication channel be-
tween committee nodes is central to the success of
building a decentralized, high performant and se-
cure network. There is a common misconception
among the public that traditional PoW networks like
Bitcoin and Ethereum are slow because of mining
puzzles are too difficult to solve. On the contrary,
the mining puzzle is nothing but a kill-time mech-
anism, so that the nodes have enough time to syn-
chronize due to network delays.
To make things worse, the aggregate network
traffic required to achieve synchronization of all
nodes, grows in polynomial order with respect to
number of nodes in the network. As the network
grows, its throughput will decay rapidly, making the
development of its ecosystem unsustainable. The
reason why PBFT based blockchains achieve far
better transactions per second than PoW, is that the
nodes required to reach consensus on a transaction
is much fewer (typically 10 – 30), and that stays
constant regardless of the total number of nodes in
the network, while we lose decentralization.
Minerva aim to achieve high throughput by us-
ing a rotating BFT committee to process transac-
tions, and PoW to determine who get elected to
the committee. There lies a problem, how do BFT
committee members communicate with eachother
about their voting decisions? If the BFT committee
use the gossip protocol of the PoW network, voting
messages will need to traverse the entire PoW net-
work before committee members hear about it. A
real life experimental deployment of this network
resulted in a throughput of 80 tps, a marginal im-
provement from Bitcoin cash.
On the other hand, BFT committee members can
make their communication channel known to the
public, to establish direct peer-to-peer communica-
tion during the voting process. However, by (4) of
our adversary model in section 4.1, we can expect
this node to be DDoS’ed, and fast chain quality will
rapidly deteriorate. Therefore, the central question
we need to address is, how to protect the identities
of rotating committee members while achieving di-
rect peer-to-peer communication?
Consider the following protocol,
(1) If a PoW node mined over ν = 100 fruits
over the last 144 snailchain blocks, and is
willing to participate in PBFT, then it auto-
matically become a member of the candi-
date committee.
(2) Hash data derived from fruits mined by
node i is used to an interval I (i) ⊂ [0, 1].
Another random number, Γ, also generated
from snailchain historical hash data (far
enough so all nodes have synchronization).
If Γ ∈ I (i), then node i has been elected
to the committee. The value of Γ should be
the same across all honest nodes to achieve
consensus.
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(3) Repeat (2) until enough committee mem-
bers have been generated.
(4) Let Γ1, ..., Γcsize be the generated uniform
random numbers. Elected nodes can com-
pute locally from snailchain data, the ad-
dresses of other members of the next com-
mittee. Suppose these are add1, ..., addcsize .
(5) Suppose node addi is a new committee
member. She will broadcast her IP ad-
dress (or other data necessary to establish a
direct communication channel), encrypted
with the public key of add1, ..., addcsize , us-
ing the gossip protocol.
(6) When another committee member addj
hear this message, she will decrypt it with
her private key, and find csize − 1 lines of
gibberish and one line containing the IP ad-
dress of node addi , while non-committee
members will be unable to decrypt this
message.
This protocol allow each committee member to
locally build a table of IP addresses of other com-
mittee members, which will allow high throughput
communication while hiding their IP address from
the public. A slight drawback of this procedure
is that if an adversary happens to be a committee
member, she can broadcast the entire list of com-
mittee IP addresses to the general public. All of the
committee nodes can be DDoS’ed in a short period
of time, and the mildly adaptive adversary assump-
tion is breached.
Therefore, we make the following adjustment.
Assume there are csize members in the commit-
tee and we create a private gossip network, with
each node gossiping to gsize other nodes. A typi-
cal value of these parameters could be csize = 31
and gsize = 4.
(1) We generate a matrix A from historical hash
data, such that Ai ,j ∈ {0, 1}, and columns
and rows of A sum up to gsize. The ma-
trix A should be the same across all honest
nodes to achieve consensus.
(2) We give label i to the committee member
who is elected by the random number Γi .
(3) Committee member i will only encrypt her
IP address using the public key of j , pro-
vided if Aij = 1.
We have just established a private gossip net-
work of csize nodes, each gossiping to gsize other
nodes. If an adversarial node made it to the BFT
committee, the biggest damage is for the BFT com-
mittee to lose gsize + 1 nodes. Setting gsize big
could improve the blockchain’s throughput, while
a smaller gsize improves the chain’s security. By
experiment we found that setting gsize < 1
6
csize
generally gives a good balance. This allowed us to
achieve over 2000 transactions per second in beta-
net live deployment setting.
If gsize is too small, we could run the risk of hav-
ing an eclipse attack, particularly when accompa-
nied by a bad choice of A. Roughly speaking, if A is
very close to a direct sum of lower dimensional ma-
trices, the resulting graph will start to have isolated
regions, making some nodes a more critical connec-
tor than others. The algorithm to consistently gen-
erate robust choices of A, relies on the representa-
tion theory of symmetric groups, which is will be
explained in a forthcoming paper.
4.5. Application Specific Design. Our consensus
design is aware of application specific requirements
and tailors for them, under the conditions that the
consistency, liveness and security properties are not
compromised.
4.5.1. Physical Timing Restriction. Conventional
consensus design by default allows miners / com-
mittee members / leaders to re-order transactions
within a small timing window. This raises a prob-
lem for some decentralized applications such as
commercial exchanges where the trading fairness
requires the timing order between transactions to
be carefully preserved, or otherwise malicious (or,
even normal rational) participants will have the in-
centive to re-order transactions, or even insert its
own transactions, to gain extra profits. And this in-
centive will be magnified under high throughputs.
And what is even worse, is that such malicious
re-ordering is impossible to distinguish because nat-
urally network latency will cause re-ordering and
such latencies can only be observed by the receiver
itself and therefore it has the final evidence of num-
bers regarding network latency.
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To support decentralized advertisement ex-
changes, we try to reduce such problems by incopo-
rating one more restriction called sticky timestamp.
More specifically, with a heuristic parameter T∆,
when proposing transactions, we require the client
to put a physical timestamp Tp inside the metadata
of the transaction, and this physical timestamp is
signed together with the other parts of the transac-
tion. Later when validators inside BFT verify the
transaction, it will do the following extra checks as
shown in Algorithm 2.
At the stage of materializing logs inside BFT, the
leader will sort the transaction batch according to
its physical timestamps and break ties (though very
unlikely) with the sequence number. Actually this
step is not necessary because we can enforce the or-
der later in the evaluation and verification. But for
simplicity, we put it here.
This set of modications give us several extra
properties:
(1) The order of transactions from any node
Ni is internally preserved according to their
physical timestamps. Thus the sequence
order of these transactions is strictly en-
forced. This will get rid of the possibility
of some malicious re-ordering that involves
two transcations from the same node.
(2) The order within a batch of transactions
output by the BFT committee is strictly or-
dered by timestamps.
(3) Nodes cannot manipulate fake physical
timestamps because of the timing window
restriction.
One obvious disadvantage of this modificaion
will be the reduction in terms of throughput due
to aborting transactions when the parameter T∆
is inappropriate for the varying network latency.
Another disadvantage is that, the BFT committee
members are still allowed to lie about their local
time and reject certain transactions. However, com-
mittee members can reject certain transactions any-
way. But honest nodes could potentially reject ig-
norant transactions because of their unsynchronzied
clocks. This issue can be reduced by adding re-
strictions on the eligibilities of the BFT commit-
tee. Later we will see that to get into the committee,
the nodes should present evidence of synchronized
clocks.
5. COMPUTATION AND DATA SHARDING, AND
SPECULATIVE TRANSACTION EXECUTION
In this section we introduce our sharding scheme.
An important modification over the original Hy-
brid Consensus is that we add computation and
data sharding support for it. And even more,
first of its kind, we design a speculative trans-
action processing system over shards. The idea
is clear. In Hybrid Consensus, the DailyBFT in-
stances are indexed into a determininstic sequence
DailyBFT[1 ... R]. We allow multiple sequences of
DailyBFT instances to exist at the same time. To
be precise, we denote the t-th DailyBFT sequence
by shard St . For simplicity, we fix the number of
shards as C . Each DailyBFT is a normal shard. Be-
sides C normal shards, we have a primary shard Sp
composed of csize nodes. The job of the primary
shard is to finalize the ordering of the output of
normal shards as well as implementing the coordi-
nator in distributed transaction processing systems.
And the normal shards, instead of directly connect-
ing with Hybrid Consensus component, submit logs
to the primary shard, which in turn talks to Hybrid
Consensus.
We don’t allow any two shards (either normal or
primary) to share common nodes, which can be en-
forced in the committee selection procedure. The
election of multiple shards is similar to the election
procedure described in Section 4.3.
We partition the state data (in terms of account
range) uniformly into C shards. This will make sure
that every query to the corresponding shard will re-
turn a consistent state. Since we are going to in-
clude meta data for each data unit, we split data
into units of data sectors and assign each data sec-
tor with an address. We have a mapping from data
position to data sector address. For simplicity, from
now on, we only discuss at the level of data sec-
tors. Each data sector DS[addr] has metadata of
rts, wts, readers, writers.
We assume the partition principle is public and
given the address addr we can get its host shard by
calling the function host(addr).
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Algorithm 2: Extra Verification Regarding Physcal Timestamp
Data: Input Transaction TX
Result: A Boolean value that indicates whether the verification is passed
1 current time← Time.Now();
2 if |current time − TX.Tp| > T∆ then
3 return false;
// if the time skew is too large, reject TX.
4 var txn history = new static dictionary of lists;
5 if txn history[TX.from] == NULL then
6 txn history[TX.from] == [TX ];
7 else
8 if txn history[TX.from][−1].Tp − TX.Tp > 0 then
9 return false;
// To make sure the transactions from the same node preserve timing order.
10 else
11 txn history[TX.from].append(TX);
12 return true;
FIGURE 1. Pseudo-Code for Extra Verification
Notice that if we treat every normal shard (when
the number of adversaries is not large) as a dis-
tributed processing unit, we can incorporate the de-
sign of logical timestamps [33] in distributed trans-
action processing systems [21], which will em-
power the processing of transactions. Here we uti-
lized a simplified version of MaaT where we don’t
do auto-adjustment of other transaction’s times-
tamps.
For normal shards, it acts exactly as described in
DailyBFT except the following changes to make it
compatible for parallel speculative execution.
For the primary shard, it collects output from
all the normal shards. Notice that, the data depen-
dency of transactions can be easily inferred by their
metadata. And a fact is that, if a transaction vis-
its multiple remote shards, it will leave traces in all
the shards involved. When a normal shard submit
logs to the primary shard, it will also write to the
snailchain.
When the primary shard receives (or fetchs from
the snailchain) a batch of txns from a shard, it will
check if it has received from all the shards trans-
actions within this batch. If after certain time-
out it has not received transactions from a partic-
ular batch, it means that batch has failed. In this
case, a whole committee switch will be triggered
at the next day starting point. After receiving all
the shards’ logs, the primary shard sorts the trans-
actions based on their commit timestamps (if some
transaction has earlier batch number, it will be con-
sidered as the first key in the sorting, however, if
its physical timestamp violates the timestamps from
many shards, we decide that batch as invalid and all
the transactions inside that batch are aborted). Af-
ter sorting, the primary shard filters all the transac-
tions and keeps a longest non-decreasing sequence
in terms of physical timestamps. Out the log to the
Hybrid Consensus component as that day’s log.
There are still many optimisation spaces. One
certain con is that the confirmation time in this de-
sign is not instant.
6. SMART CONTRACTS IN VIRTUAL MACHINES
6.1. Design Rationale. Of all the reasons to have
an Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) [32], one of
aims is to meter the usage with a transaction fee in a
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Algorithm 3: Sharding and Speculative Transaction Processing
1 On BecomeShard:
2 Initialize all the state data sectors:
lastReaderTS = −1, lastWriterTS = −1, readers = [], writers = []
3 With transaction TX on shard Si :
4 On Initialization:
5 TX.lowerBound = 0;
6 TX.upperBound = +∞;
7 TX.state = RUNNING;
8 TX.before = [];
9 TX.after = [];
10 TX.ID = rand;
11 On Read Address(addr):
12 if host(addr) == Si then
13 Send readRemote(addr) to itself;
14 else
15 Broadcast readRemote(addr, TX.id) to host(addr);
16 Async wait for 2f + 1 valid signed replies within timeout To ;
17 Abort TX when the timeout ticks;
18 Let val, wts, IDs be the majority reply;
19 TX.before.append(IDs);
20 TX.lowerBound = max(TX.lowerBound, wts);
21 return val;
22 OnWrite Address(addr):
23 if host(addr) == Si then
24 Send writeRemote(addr) to itself;
25 else
26 Broadcast writeRemote(addr, TX.id) to host(addr);
27 Async wait for 2f + 1 valid signed replies within timeout To ;
28 Abort TX when the timeout ticks.
29 Let rts, IDs be the majority reply;
30 TX.after.append(IDs) TX.lowerBound = max(TX.lowerBound, rts);
31 return;
32 On Finish Execution: for every TX′inTX .before do
33 TX.lowerBound = max(TX.lowerBound, TX’.upperBound);
34 for every TX′inTX .after do
35 TX.upperBound = min(TX.upperBound, TX’.lowerBound);
36 if TX.lowerBound ¿ TX.upperBound then
37 Abort TX;
38 Broadcast Precommit(TX .ID, ⌊TX .lowerBound+TX .upperBound
2
⌋) to all the previous remote shards which
TX has accessed;
// If TX.upperBound = ∞, we can set an arbitrary number larger than TX .lowerBound.
39 On receive readRemote(addr, ID):
40 if host(addr) == Si then
41 DS[addr].readers.append(ID);
42 return DS[addr].value, DS[addr].wts, DS[addr].writers;
43 else
44 Ignore
45 On receive writeRemote(addr, ID):
46 if host(addr) == Si then
47 DS[addr].writers.append(ID);
48 Write to a local copy;
49 return DS[addr].rts, DS[addr].readers;
50 else
51 Ignore
FIGURE 2. Pseudo-Code for Sharding and Speculative Transaction Processing
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Algorithm 4: Sharding and Speculative Transaction Processing (cont.)
1 On receive Precommit(ID, cts):
2 Look up TX by ID;
3 if Found and cts not in [TX.lowerBound, TX.upperBound] then
4 Broadcast Abort(ID) to the sender’s shard.;
5 TX.lowerBound = TX.upperBound = cts;
6 For every data sector DS [addr ] TX reads, set DS [addr ].rts = max(DS [addr ].rts, cts);
7 For every data sector DS [addr ] TX writes, set DS [addr ].wts = max(DS [addr ].wts, cts);
8 Broadcast Commit(ID, batchCounter) to the sender’s shard.;
// batchCounter is a number which increases by 1 whenever the shard submit a batch
of log to the primary shard.
9 On receive 2f + 1 Commit(ID, batchCounter) from each remote shards which TX has accessed:
10 TX.lowerBound = TX.upperBound = cts;
11 For every data sector DS [addr ] TX reads, set DS [addr ].rts = max(DS [addr ].rts, cts);
12 For every data sector DS [addr ] TX writes, set DS [addr ].wts = max(DS [addr ].wts, cts);
13 Mark TX committed;
14 Let TX .metadata = [ShardID, batchCounter ];
15 On output log
16 Sort TX ’s based on their cts . Break ties by physical timestamp.
Proof of Work model. Since ours is a hybrid model,
we’ll take the liberty of exploring this design space
a little bit further. Let us consider the possibility of
a hybrid cloud ecosystem.
A basic problem people have faced is the
kind of crude mathematical notations followed in
Ethereum’s Yellow Paper [32]. We therefore hope
to follow something like KEVM jellopaper [18] to
list out the EVM and TVM (described in 6.2) spec-
ifications. And in future, we hope to maintain our
own specifications through Truechain’s github ac-
count (https://github.com/truechain).
6.1.1. What about containers instead of VMs? One
of the blockchain frameworks out there that come as
close to this idea as possible, is Hyperledger’s Fab-
ric framework [9]. If one sets out to convert Fab-
ric’s permissioned nature into permissionless, one
of the foremost challenges would be to solve the
chaincode issue. What this means is while it’s pos-
sible to keep a chaincode/smart contract in a single
container, that is not a scalable model for a public
chain. Having such a model for public chain means
having to run several thousand containers, per se,
several thousand smart contracts on a single node
(because each node maintains a copy).
There have been attempts from the community
on being able to run a certain maximum containers
per node. The limit currently is 100 pods per node,
per se, approximately 250 containers per node, as il-
lustrated in Kubernetes container orchestration plat-
form [5] and Red Hat’s Openshift Container Plat-
form 3.9’s Cluster Limits [7]. Even with latest stor-
age techniques like brick multiplexing [1], the max
possible value (say MAX CONTR) of containers
could not possibly reach (at least right now) 1000.
This issue could further be looked up in the discus-
sions on kubernetes issues github page [4] around
workload-specific limits that usually determine the
maximum pods per node. People who wish to scale
containers usually prefer horizontal scaling rather
than a vertical scaleup [2, 6], as the latter signif-
icantly increases complexity of design decisions.
And there’s no one-size-fits-them-all rule for a clus-
ter scale configuration as that entirely depends on
the workload, which being more in our case due to
its decentralized nature, isn’t very convincing for
taking a step towards scaling this. At this point, it
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becomes more of an innovation problem than a sim-
ple technical specification search. Ethereum cur-
rently has > 1000 smart contracts deployed. There-
fore this would be nothing but a crude attempt at
optimizing the container ecosystem’s design space.
Now let us expand a bit on the container scenario.
Given the above crisis, a possible solution is to
use container in a serverless architecture. But con-
sider a scenario where > 2000 contracts are online
and the concurrent requests, i.e., invocation calls
to chaincode (a moving window) at a time exceed
MAX CONTR value, we then face the same prob-
lem all over again. Therefore, it is only advisable
to add a throttling rate limit on the max concurrent
requests. This severly limits the Transactions Per
Second from the consensus, by design. Engineering
should not be a bottleneck to what could be achiev-
able alternatively. Therefore, we choose to stick to
EVM design, although a bit modified for our pur-
pose.
6.2. Truechain Virtual Machine (TVM). A typ-
ical example in this space would be that of the
Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) [32], which
tries to follow total determinism, is completely op-
timized and is as simple as it gets, to make incen-
tivization a simple step to calculate. It also supports
various features like off-stack storage of memory,
contract delegation and inter-invocation value stor-
age.
We would reuse the EVM specifications for the
snailchain, but add a new specification for TVM in
the next version of this Yellow Paper, after care-
ful consideration of the design rationale similar to
EVM, deriving the stack based architecture utilizing
the Keccak-256 hashing technique and the Elliptic-
curve cryptography (ECC) approach.
The Truechain infrastructure will utilize a combi-
nation of EVM and another EVM-like bytecode ex-
ecution platform for launching smart contracts. We
choose to use run VM only on fastchain, embedded
within each full node, so they could manage invo-
cation calls on per-need basis.
The TVM backs the DailyBFT powered chains,
which interact with the following components:
• re-using some of the concepts from
tendermint, like the ABCI (Application
BlockChain Interface) which offers an ab-
straction level as means to enable a consen-
sus engine running in one process to man-
age an application state running in another.
• A different consensus engine pertaining to
dailyBFT chain,
• A permissioned Ethereum Virtual Machine
• An RPC gateway, which guarantees (in
a partially asynchronous network) transac-
tion finality
7. INCENTIVE DESIGN AND GAS FEE
The Proof of work protocol have a proven track
record of attracting computational resources at an
unprecedented rate. While existing PoW networks
such as bitcoin and ethereum have been successful
in their own right, the computational resources they
attracted have been nothing more than very power-
ful hash calculators. They cost a lot of electricity to
run, and produce nothing useful.
In this section we will present a concept of
compensation infrastructure in order to balance the
workload of BFT committee members and non-
member full nodes. We invented a new incentive
design for PoW, where participating resources can
be redirected to do useful things, such as scaling
transactions per second (referred to as “TPS“ from
hereon), and providing on-chain data storage.
Ethereum gas price is determined by a spot mar-
ket with no possibility of arbitrage, similar to that of
electricity spot market studied in [30]. We consider
this market to be incomplete, and therefore funda-
mental theorem of asset pricing does not apply[14].
Thus, the underlying gas price will follow a shot-
noise process, that is known for its high volatility.
We introduce a “gas market place” where gas will
be traded as futures, and this market is complete
in the infinitesimal limit. This is expected to sig-
nificantly reduce gas price volatility compared to
Ethereum.
The following subsections will talking about
each component of the incentive design in detail.
7.1. ASIC resistance. Truechain’s mining algo-
rithm will be fundamentally ASIC resistant. We
will define what this means, and why Truehash can
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achieve fundamental ASIC resistance in a forth-
coming paper. Here, we will briefly outline what we
have done. ASIC’s are far better hash calculators
than any general purpose computer, but they can
only one procedure and cannot be reprogrammed.
Therefore, if there is an automated procedure that
would switch the mining algorithm once every few
months (12000 snailchain blocks), then it would not
be profitable for anyone to build them.
We came up with the following conditions for
fundamental ASIC resistance,
(1) There exist a large pool of potential mining
algorithms (e.g. 2048!) that is unfeasible to
hard code each of them to an ASIC chip.
(2) The mining algorithm is capable of auto-
matically switching without having human
interference, such as a hard fork.
(3) The correctness of the new mining algo-
rithm must be provable (so all nodes can
come to consensus), and the process must
be verifiably unpredictable (so its impossi-
ble to secretly build ASICminers before the
switch).
The classical PoWmining basically repeated cal-
culate hash(v(nonce)), where v(nonce) is a func-
tion that takes the mining nonce, block header and
pads it to the correct dimension. We compute
instead, the modified hash function, hash(ρ(g) ∗
v(nonce)). Here, G is a large group (e.g. S2048)
and g ∈ G , ρ : G → V is a homomorphism from
G to a vector space V , so that the matrix multipli-
cation ρ(g) ∗ v(nonce) is valid on V .
As we can see, by simply replacing ρ(g) to ρ(g),
for a different element g ′ ∈ G , we get a completely
different hash algorithm. Since G = S2048 is a large
group, |G | = 2048!, the space of potential hash al-
gorithms to choose from is 2048!.
Finally, we can generate the new group element
g ′ from the hash data of snailchain, through ap-
plication of group representation theory. The new
mining algorithm is therefore provable and unpre-
dictable.
7.2. Gas fee and sharding. Gas price is traded in
a futures market, where the futures contract is mani-
fested by a smart contract. Specifically, the contract
will be executed as follows.
• Party A agree to pay party B xxx TRUE,
while party B promises to execute party A’s
smart contract, between time T0 and T1,
that cost exactly 1 gas to run.
• Party B will contribute xxx TRUE to a pool
corresponding to the committee C that ex-
ecuted party A’s smart contract. This is
called the gas pool.
• Members of C will receive an equal share
of the pool, and return an average cost per
gas µ for the pool.
• If B contributed less than µ, she must make
up for the difference by paying another
party who contributed more than µ. If B
contributed more than µ, she will receive
the difference from another party.
Under this scheme, liquidity providers are re-
warded when they correctly anticipate network
stress, and hence creating a complete market in the
infinitesimal limit. Price volatility are absorbed by
the averaging mechanism in the gas pool making
the price itself a good indicator of network stress.
Our intention to ensure gas price is traded
roughly within a predetermined interval. Hence,
if the moving average price sustain above a cer-
tain threshold, a new PBFT committee is spawned
through a quantum appearance process. On the
other hand, if the moving average price sustain be-
low a certain threshold, an existing PBFT commit-
tee will not be given a successor after it finished
serving its term.
The proportion of mining reward will be dis-
tributed as follows. Let n be the number of PBFT
committee running at a certain instance, and α > 1.
Proportion of mining reward going to PBFT nodes
is equal to n
α+n
, and PoW nodes α
α+n
. This is to re-
flect that in later stages of the chain, new nodes are
incentivized to contribute to the blockchain’s over-
all TPS, hence ensuring continued scalability of the
chain. The parameter α represent the number of
PBFT committees when mining reward is divided
50-50.
8. DATA STORAGE
Truechain aim to achieve 10,000 TPS on each
shard, and number of shards is designed to grow lin-
early with respect to the volume transaction demand
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(roughly correlates to number of nodes). The bit-
coin network has generated roughly 170 gb of trans-
action history data over the course of 10 years at 10
TPS. Going from 10 to 10,000, the same volume
of data is expected to be generated every 3 days.
At 100 shards, or 1 million TPS, we can expect it
to generate every 45 minutes. Hence, having ev-
ery node to store the entire transaction history like
bitcoin, is no longer feasible in a high TPS public
chain.
A number of solutions have been proposed such
as having a check point once every few hours/days,
where every node is only required to store trans-
action history from previous n check points. But
where do we store rest of the transaction history, as
nobody is incentivized to store that.
Our solution is to seamlessly merge transaction
processing with the storage capability of an IPFS in
a unified incentive infrastructure. This will provide
a solution to store transaction history, and allow a
plethora of sophisticated applications to be running
completely decentralized on the Truechain architec-
ture. Data storage on Truechain will be possible in
three levels,
• Level 1: Stored on every PoW node like bit-
coin and ethereum. It is the most perma-
nent way of storage, alas also the least effi-
cient. It’s predominately designed to store
the block’s Merkel root, and other informa-
tion of high value density. Users will pay a
gas fee to PoW miners.
• Level 2: There will be an IPFS-like file
system where a limited copy of the data
is distributed to storage nodes throughout
the chain. This is designed for storing the
bulk of main net’s historical transactions
and data-heavy decentralized applications.
Users will pay miners a fee for both storage
and retrieval.
9. FUTURE DIRECTION
Even after optimizations to the original Hybrid
Consensus, we acknowledge various optimizations
possible on top of what was proposed in this paper.
There are following possibilities:
• Improving timestamp synchronization for
all nodes, with no dependency on central-
ized NTP servers.
• Detailed incentivization techniques for
compensation infrastructure, so heavy in-
frastructure investors don’t suffer from
’left-out’, ’at a loss’ problem
• Sharding techniques with replica creation
to minimize the transaction set rejection
from the BFT committee.
• Addition of zero knowledge proof tech-
niques for privacy.
• Hybrid infrastructure of EVM, TVM and
Linux container ecosystem.
• Sections for Virtual Machine Specification,
Binary Data Encoding Method, Signing
Transactions, Fee schedule and Ethash al-
ternative.
10. CONCLUSIONS
We have formally defined Hybrid Consensus
protocol and its implementation along with plau-
sible speculations in the original proposal. In this
draft, we have introduced various new concepts
some of which we will detail in the next version
very soon. We recommend people to choose ASIC
resistant hardware for deployment of the PoW only
versus full nodes, although more details on hard-
ware shall follow soon.
• A permissioned BFT chain that runs on a
few nodes in the permissionless PoW based
network.
• The BFT committee is a rotating one, pre-
venting corruption in a timely manner
• The BFT committee is responsible for
transaction validation, and the PoW nodes
are only responsible for choosing/electing
the committee members according to some
rules we’ve derived and re-defined.
• The new permissioned VM, we’ve sur-
mised, could be inspired from the EVM, but
with different block states and transaction
execution flows
• The contemporary permissionless EVM in
the PoW chain co-exists with this new per-
missioned VM (which we call Truechain
Virtual Machine - TVM)
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• The TVM would be the one to validate
any transactions related to consensus, while
the traditional EVM would need to be re-
worked to not really mine for consensus,
but for election of BFT using Variable Day
length puzzle.
• The incentivation model needs to be re-
worked such that it is based off of TVM,
and we still reward the miners in PoW
chain.
• We invented a new market mechanism, sat-
isfying the assumptions of fundamental the-
orem of asset pricing, for how gas should be
traded.
• We would eventually support sharding for
the BFT committee nodes, for scalability.
• We address the storage issue for high TPS
public chains, and introduced a method that
seamlessly merge transaction process with
decentralized data storage.
• A compensation infrastructure, which
accounts for node configuration non-
uniformity (different CPU/memory/network
bandwidth in the node pool), would eventu-
ally be a part of the consensus, thus speed-
ing up transactions.
• The smart contracts execution would thus
only happen in TVM (BFT node).
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APPENDIX A. TERMINOLOGY
TrueChain Virtual Machine (TVM): In contrast to EVM which handles incentivization and rotating
committee selection, a TVM is based on similar design principles but carries out actual consensus
and voting based off of PBFT based Hybrid Consensus.
